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BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma final judgement/Decree of Divorce entered
by the Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, Utah, on October
21st, 1998. A Notice of Appeal wasfiledon November 17,1998.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a- 3(h) U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellee does not disagree with Appellant's Statement of the Issues
Presented.
Appellee would like an award of costs and attorney's fees.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Section 30-3-5(1) provides in relevant part, that:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the...property, debts or obligations and
parties.
Rule 40, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such
terms as are just, including the payment of cost occasioned by such
postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause shown.
If the motion is made upon the ground of absence of evidence, such
motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected to
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the
continuance to state upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon admits that such
evidence would be given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall
not be postponed on that ground.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Statement of the case as set forth in
her brief with the addition in the "Course of Proceedings" section that
Appellee submitted Discovery to Appellant on April 2,1998 [R.9], filed a
Motion to Compel on May 8, 1998, [R.10], and received responses on May
13,1998. [R.11].
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee will continue Appellant's use of the parties first names.
Brenda is Appellant. Ivan is Appellee.
This case concerns the property award after a divorce trial between
two people who were married for a short period of time. They were married
on July 29,1995 [R.1]. Appellee filed for divorce on February 26,1998.
[R.1]. The marriage was a happy one for about a year. [TR-14], but it
deteriorated so that Appellant moved from the marital residence in October
or November 1997 [TR-26; 66]. (The first page of the trial transcript in the
court file is numbered "73." The following pages are not numbered
separately by the court. All references to the transcript are indicated "TR"
and refer to the court reporters page number.)
Although there is no testimony about the ages of the parties, that they
were advanced in years is supported in the record of Ivan's references to his
Social Security payments [TR-19] and the fact that this was Ivan's third
marriage and Brenda's fourth. [TR-16; 65].
3

Both parties owned a residence that had been acquired beforehand
from non-martial assets. Ivan had 1.25 acres with a trailer that his mother
gave to him and a brother and a sister. Ivan purchased their interest prior to
the marriage [TR-21-2]. Brenda owned a trailer [TR-28; 67]. She had lived
in it for at least eight years before marrying Ivan. It was habitable [TR-67].
The parties moved into Ivan's trailer after their marriage [TR-20; 68].
During the marriage the parties kept their finances separate [TR-30].
They maintained separate bank accounts and credit cards [TR-30-1; 53; 716]. They each kept their separate vehicle [TR-32].
Each had their own source of income. Brenda worked at Allen
Memorial Hospital [TR-20;57]. Although Brenda characterizes Ivan as selfemployed in her brief, he worked only part-time. He was restricted in the
amount of money he could earn by Social Security [TR-19]. His major
source of income was payments for the property he had acquired and sold
before the marriage [TR-19].
After moving into Ivan's trailer, improvements were made to make it
habitable. (It was a 1956 ten-wide trailer with a room on the side [TR-20]).

4

marriage [TR-72-3], and that she would not make any payments on the
$25,000.00 loan for home improvements [TR-76].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant
Brenda another continuance. The point is moot since Appellant only
requested an extension to allow time to obtain an appraisal and the Court
allowed the introduction of Appellant's value of the trailer. Appellee should
not be penalized for Appellant's failure to exercise due diligence in
preparing for trial.
The division of the personal and real property was fair and equitable.
ARGUMENT I
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE.
Appellee takes virtually no exception to the general principles of
caselaw cited by Appellant in this argument or the issue of property
divisions. His position is that the even conceding the equitable bases for
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Ivan took out a loan for $25,000 for the improvements [TR-9]. He
introduced Exhibits 1 and 2 showing the home improvement expenses.
Brenda never made loan payments [TR-23; 74]. She is not willing to make
any future payments or assume any obligation for the loan payments [TR75-6]. Ivan has made 38 payments of $338.41 on the loan and has 82 more
payments of the same amount that he was ordered to pay [TR-23]. Ivan
made all of the payments for taxes and insurance on his property [TR-22].
He paid the utilities [TR-53].
The parties intended to fix Brenda's trailer up and rent it [TR-63].
Instead, Brenda allowed her son to live there rent-free during the marriage
[TR-69]. She paid the property tax on the trailer [TR-69]. She made some
space rent payments of $150.00 each for the trailer [TR-69-70]. During the
marriage Brenda had replaced or repaired a water heater, stove, air
conditioner, carpeting and countertops in the trailer [TR-83-4]. Total
improvements were at least $3500.00 [TR-85].
Brenda's position is that Ivan had no equity or interest in her mobile
home [TR-71-2], no interest in her retirement benefits accrued during the
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The argument that Brenda was surprised by failure to reach an
agreement on her share of the equity is contrary to her arguments to the trial
court. Brenda concedes that "it's clear from the Complaint that respondent
has no interest whatsoever in the residence they shared." [TR-7]. See also
paragraph 7 of the Complaint. [R.2] Brenda has produced no evidence that a
settlement was close. To the contrary, Ivan invited contact trying to settle the
case by letters dated August 21 and September 11th (See Addendum). There
was no response.
The cases Brenda cites support Ivan's position. Hill v. Dickerson, 839
P.2d 1018, (Utah App 1992). Held there was no abuse of discretion in failing
to grant a continuance when movant had failed to obtain a witness in a
timely matter, exactly Brenda's situation.
The instant case is distinguished from Christensen v. Christensen, 619
P.2d 1372 (Utah 1980). In that case Appellee had wrongfully withheld
promised evidence from Appellant. There is no indication here that Appellee
withheld anything from Appellant through nonfeasance, misfeasance or
malfeasance. Indeed, the record supports a total lack of Brenda to pursue
information or evidence through either of her attorneys.
8

relief cited by Appellant there is no abuse by the trial court. Further, in
considering harm to Appellant by denial of the continuance, it is apparent
she suffered none. She wanted a continuance to introduce testimony about
the appraised value of Ivan's trailer [TR-4]. She introduced such testimony.
Brenda takes the position that the trial court abused its discretion on the bald
assertions that the matter was continued based on a stipulation of the parties
and that she was unfairly surprised when an anticipated settlement was not
reached.
The record does not support a stipulated first continuance. Appellant
filed a Motion on July 17,1998. Although the record does not support it, the
clear inference is that Brenda obtained a continuance to obtain new counsel.
This point is conceded by Brenda on page 9 of her brief. See also #3 under
Course of Proceedings, page 3, Appellant's Brief.
* The balance of Brenda's argument is that she exercised due diligence,
that she believed the matter would be settled, and that she was surprised at
having to go to trial. The matter to be settled was Brenda's share of equity in
Ivan's house.
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE.
Again, Appellee does not quibble with Appellant's caselaw on
equitable division of marital property or her characterizations of a marriage
as a partnership. However, the trial court's division was fair.
The Utah Supreme Court discussed in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133,
(Utah 1987) at 135 the fact that premarital property is viewed as separate
property. It sets out several criteria to use in determining if the other spouse
should receive an interest in such property including joint enhancement of
the property. The Court indicated consideration of whether the property was
acquired before the marriage, age, the standard of living, duration of
marriage, and what the parties gave up are relevant. The Burke Court did not
award an interest.
Applying the Burke criteria and equitable standards to the real estate,
the trial court's division of the real property was fair. It was Ivan's separate
property before the marriage. Brenda did not give up her trailer to live with
Ivan and in fact, allowed her son to live in it rent-free, waiving a benefit to
the marriage. Brenda did not assume any of thefinancialburden of Ivan's
house and was not willing to do so. She valued her share of the equity at
9

$4000.00 in her interrogatories [TR- 77] and had put $3500.00 of
improvements into her own trailer. Brenda did not seem to be interested in
giving equity to Ivan in an increase in value to her trailer. She objected to
testimony concerning projects Ivan had done for her [TR-30]. The parties
kept all theirfinancesseparate. Brenda did not feel Ivan had an interest in
her retirement accrued during the marriage.
It is impossible to say what the value of the increase of equity is in
Ivan's home during the marriage. Brenda's contention is that the original
value of $15,000 is not accurate. The value of something is its fair market
value, not what you pay your family for it. Brenda did not introduce, and
never sought to introduce, any evidence of the value of Ivan's property at the
time of the marriage.
It need also be noted that since the parties kept their finances separate
and that Ivan made all of the loan payments, any increase in the equity of his
trailer was pad for from his separate pre-marital estate. The majority of his
income camefromthe pre-marital sale of real estate [TR-19; 127].
The evidence of a market analysis by a part-time real estate agent
provides no indication of the increase of value during the marriage. Any
10

such evidence needs to be considered unreliable. The agent never entered
the home or made an effort to. Her analysis isflawedsince she did not enter
the home, a point she conceded [TR-107]. She is not aware of the interior
deficiencies Ivan testified about [TR-52-3]. The Court returned $2500.00 of
landscaping improvements to Brenda when she indicated she wanted them
[TR-110;126;128-9].
Likewise, Brenda has not shown this Court that the division of the
personal property was capricious. She did not testify nor has she argued over
monetary values. The record indicates that Ivan was not present when
Brenda moved out of the home. She had free rein in removing whatever she
wanted and did so. Items were removed from the house by her family
without her knowledge [TR-78-80]. The Court's award merely returned to
Ivan his share of the property and items he had made for the home [TR-3740].
Brenda's attitude toward the equity seems to be the classic "what's his
is mine and what's mine is mine." She had no desire to allow Ivan an
interest in anything of hers. She had not given Ivan any benefit from renting
her residence while she lived in his trailer. She is not willing to make any
11

payments on the loan she argues was used to increase the trailer's equity. If
this Court finds Brenda is entitled to an interest in Ivan's trailer, it should
order her to assume half of the payments.

CONCLUSION
It is unfair to Appellee to penalize Ivan for Appellant's failure to
exercise due diligence in preparing for trial. Once negotiations have failed
and a trial date is scheduled, a party is remiss in not making adequate
preparations. There is no evidence that Appellant's supposed expectations of
a settlement was realistic.
The division of the real and personal property was equitable.
Appellant has not shown any abuse of discretion that would allow a reversal
of the trial court.

DATED this Z&A

of August, 1999.

William L. Schtjhz
[
Attorney for Appetfee^\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to Rosalie Reilly, 148 South Main, #1, P.O.
Box 404, Monticello, Utah 84532, postage prepaid, this ZjUt of August,
1999.

LJJJU. J,
WILLI
Attorney
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435-259-5914

August 21, 1998

Rosalie Reilly
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 404
Monticello, UT 84535
RE:

Winder v. Winder

Dear Rose:
Please advise regarding the status of discussions with your client regarding a
settlement in the above-entitled divorce action. The matter is set for hearing on October 6.
Thank you.
Cordially,

William L. Schultz
WLS/ak
Ince;0702981tr.wp

Please direct all correspondence to the above Moab office. Thank you.

WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ
A T T O R N E Y AT LAW
MOAB

Oh F t C E *

MONTICELLO

t*e EAST CENTER
P O LJOX 9 3 7
MOAB, U1AH 8453£
4 35-?59-59l4

OFFICE1

317 S O U T H M A I N , #3
MONTICELLO. UTAH 8 4 5 3 5
435-587-2808
FAX 4 3 5 - 2 5 9 - 8 1 9 4 -

September 11, 1998

Rosalie Reilly
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 404
Monticello, UT 84535
RE:

Winder v. Winder

Dear Rose:
I have not received a response from you to my letter of August 21 regarding
attempting to settle the above matter before the divorce hearing on October 6. Please
let me know your standing in this matter. Thank you.
Cordially,

William L. Schultz
WLS/ak

Please direct all correspondence to the above Moab office. Thank you.

